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An Analysis of Several New Product Performance Metrics
Abstract
For most firms, new product development is the engine for growth and profitability. A firm's new product
success depends on its ability to manage the product development process in a way that employs scarce
resources to achieve the goal of the firm as well as the specific project's objectives. Simple and measurable
performance metrics have been proposed and applied to monitor and compensate the development teams. In
this paper, we develop a modeling frame work to analyze the implications of setting managerial priorities for
three commonly used new product performance metrics: (1) time-to-market, (2) product performance, and
(3) total development cost. We model new product development as a “product performance production”
process that requires scarce development resources. Setting a target for development teams for each of these
performance metrics can constrain this performance production process and, thereby, affect the other
performance metrics. We model the constrained process as a restricted case of a general process that does not
have such constraints. We benchmark each constrained process against the optimal, unrestricted process with
respect to the level of the resource intensity employed during the development process, the time-to-market,
and the performance level of the new product at launch. We show that an overly ambitious time-to-market
target leads to an upward bias in resource intensity usage and a downward bias in product performance (i.e.,
evolutionary product innovation). In addition, our results suggest that the target time-to-market approach
may ignore the effect of cannibalization and, thus, can perform suboptimally if a significant degree of
cannibalization in the existing product market is expected. Given a target product performance, we show that
the coordination between marketing and R&D is easier because the resulting development resource intensity
and time-to-market decisions becomes separable. However, an overly ambitious product performance target
leads to an upward bias in the development resource intensity and a delayed product launch that misses the
window of opportunity. Finally, we show that the target development cost approach can lead a downward bias
in product performance and a premature product launch. The above analyses are performed for a
monopolistic firm, and they are extended to passive and active competitive environment.
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Abstract
For most ¯rms, new product development is the engine for growth and pro¯tability. A ¯rm's
new product success depends on its ability to manage the product development process in
a way that employs scarce resources to achieve the goal of the ¯rm as well as the speci¯c
project's objectives. Simple and measurable performance metrics have been proposed and
applied in order to monitor and compensate the development teams. In this paper, we develop
a modeling framework in order to analyze the implications of setting managerial priorities
for three commonly used new product performance metrics: 1) time-to-market, 2) product
performance, and 3) total development cost. We model new product development as a `product
performance production' process that requires scarce development resources. Setting a target
for development teams for each of these performance metrics can constrain this performance
production process and thereby a®ect the other performance metrics. We model the constrained
process as a restricted case of a general process which does not have such constraints.
We benchmark each constrained process against the optimal, unrestricted process with respect
to the level of the resource intensity employed during the development process, the time-to-
market, and the performance level of the new product at launch. We show that an overly
ambitious time-to-market target leads to an upward bias in resource intensity usage and a
downward bias in product performance (i.e., evolutionary product innovation.) In addition, our
results suggest that the target time-to-market approach may ignore the e®ect of cannibalization
and thus can perform suboptimally if a signi¯cant degree of cannibalization in the existing
product market is expected. Given a target product performance, we show that the coordination
between marketing and R&D is easier because the resulting development resource intensity and
time to market decisions becomes separable. However, an overly ambitious product performance
target leads to an upward bias in the development resource intensity and a delayed product
launch that misses the window of opportunity. Finally, we show that the target development
cost approach can lead a downward bias in product performance and a premature product
launch. The above analyses are performed for a monopolistic ¯rm and they are extended to
passive and active competitive environment.
Key Words: New product development, product performance, time to market, development
costs, performance metrics
11 Introduction
For most ¯rms, new product development is strategic because it can signi¯cantly a®ect their
competitive position in the marketplace. A ¯rm's new product success depends on its ability to
employ scarce development resources to deliver high-performance products in a timely fashion.
E®ective management of the development process is di±cult due to its underlying complexity
and the wide range of product performance criteria that it can in°uence. Three critical deter-
minants of new product success that are directly a®ected by the management of timing and
resources are: 1) time-to- market, 2) product performance, and 3) total development cost (Clark
and Fujimoto, 1991). These determinants of new product success, however, are interrelated and
they may con°ict. Firms must consider potential tradeo®s among them. In Cohen, Eliashberg,
and Ho (1996), we introduce a model for studying the tradeo® between time-to-market and
product performance. In this paper, we extend our previous work by allowing the level of de-
velopment resource to vary with time and we develop a more general modeling framework that
simultaneously considers the potential tradeo®s among all three determinants of new product
success.
Indeed, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) empirically show that the three crucial determinants of new
product success are time to market, product performance and development resources. (For a
comprehensive review of other determinants of new product success, see Krishnan and Ulrich
(2000)). Previous research has considered only tradeo®s among a subset of these determi-
nants. The economics R&D race literature assumes that the level of product performance is
¯xed and examines the tradeo® between time-to-market and development resources (Kamien
and Schwartz, 1982; Reinganum, 1989). This tradeo® exists because `crashing' a project costs
money (Mans¯eld, 1988). Time-to-market has also been an active area of research in mar-
keting (see, for example, Mahajan, Muller, and Kerin, 1984; Wilson and Norton, 1989; Lilien
and Yoon, 1990). This stream of research, however, often does not consider explicitly product
development-related issues. For example, it is often assumed that the development cycle and
investment are negligible. Our model aims to integrate these separate streams of literature.
We conceptualize new product development as a `product performance production' process
that requires scarce development resources. Under a control-theoretic formulation, the level of
development resource intensity and time-to-market are control variables that can signi¯cantly
in°uence the product performance (the state variable), which in turn a®ects the market share
2and life-cycle pro¯ts.
In practice, many ¯rms focus their attention primarily on one or two of the success determi-
nants; few place equal emphasis on all three. In mature industries, for example, managers
tend to focus primarily on the total development cost. Start-up ¯rms with limited development
budget may also want to focus on the total development cost. In high-tech industries, on the
other hand, new product evaluation is more likely to be based on product performance and the
time-to-market (e.g., computer equipment). Most ¯rms set strategic targets for one of these
metrics in order to control the new product management process. We use our model to study
the implications of setting such managerial targets for each of the three determinants of success.
Setting a target on time-to-market has become a commonplace strategy because of the increas-
ingly compressed product life-cycles in many industries. For example, in response to competitive
pressures, Ingersoll-Rand recently set the time-to-market for all of its new products under de-
velopment in its industrial tools division to be one year (Cohen and Ho, 1996). We believe
that the time factor must be put into context and that a short time-to-market must be weighed
against its associated costs and potential impact on product performance. In industries where
there are natural product introduction times (model year and season), ¯rms may have less
freedom to choose time-to-market. Examples include automobiles (beginning of the year), toys
(Christmas season), and apparel (fashion season). In these cases, multiple targets can be set
and studied using the proposed model.
A product performance target is often derived from a market share target. An ambitious prod-
uct performance target can shape the development process in a way that leads to a revolutionary
product introduction. For instance, Eastman Kodak sets product performance target to ensure
market leadership by requiring their new product development teams to deliver a ¯xed incre-
ment of superiority relative to the best product in the market (Ho, 1993). The same approach
can be also used by followers in a product market who wish to catch up with the leader. This
approach may also be relevant in situations where ¯rms race to overcome a certain technology
barrier in order to develop a better new product (e.g., a new drug for a certain disease). It is
certainly a chief metric in situations where product safety and liability are at stake (e.g., drugs,
airplanes).
3Setting a target for total development cost can be a result of an internal budget allocation
process. In situations where development funds are limited, new product development teams
may be directed to manage the development process in a manner that will not exceed the de-
velopment cost budget. This approach is particularly common when the primary input to the
development process is engineering labor input and the required engineering know-how is so
specialized that it is impossible to hire additional people with the required know-how. In such
cases, the development cost is constrained by the availability of the engineering personnel. It
is also observed often in developing entertainment products such as movies.
The implications of setting speci¯c managerial priorities on these critical determinants are un-
clear. We study the e®ect of setting a target on each of the determinants by modeling the
resulting development process (with the targets) as a restricted case of a more general uncon-
strained development process. We benchmark the constrained development process against the
globally optimal (unrestricted) process with respect to the level of resource intensity employed
during the development process, the time-to-market, and the performance of new product at
launch. We employ pro¯tability as the common goal. Systematic deviations from the uncon-
strained process are highlighted so that ¯rms who use the constrained processes can become
aware of their potential impact.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model formulation and
validate the underlying model assumptions. Section 3 provides conditions to characterize the
optimal policy under unconstrained development process and the three constrained development
processes. Section 4 discusses the results and outlines future research directions.
2 Model Formulation
Figure 1 illustrates the basic problem scenarios (see Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho, 1996 for a de-
tailed justi¯cation and applicability of such scenarios). There is a ¯xed window of opportunity,
T , beyond which the product has no value. This window of opportunity is divided into two
broadly de¯ned stages: the Development stage and the Marketing stage. The ¯rm is assumed
to have an existing product with performance A . At time T , a new product with performance0 P
A(T ) is launched. It is assumed that the new product completely replaces the existing prod-P
4uct. The ¯rm's objective is to maximize pro¯t from existing and new products over the time
window T . There are two strategic decisions, 1) choice of launching time, T , and 2) selectionP
of a level of development resources over time, X(t), to achieve an appropriate level of product
performance, A(T ). These decisions are linked, since a high level of development resourcesP
will give rise to a faster development process. Under the setup illustrated here, a day spent in
the Development stage means a delay of one day in the Marketing stage for the new product.
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ]
The level of development resources is measured in dollars. It is the strategic development
decision. During the development stage, the development team improves the performance of
the product. Enhancements in performance are achieved by climbing a \performance ladder."
Let the performance of the product at time t be A(t). The key relationship in our model
framework is the speed of performance improvement. Speci¯cally, we de¯ne speed of increment
for performance as follows:
dA(t) ®_= A(t) = K ¢X(t) ; (2.1)
dt
where
X(t) = level of development resource at time t,
® = resource productivity parameter,
K = constant of proportionality for speed of performance improvement. It is
proportional to the level of capital investment in the development technology.
There are diminishing returns to resource input, and thus 0 < ® < 1. Equation (2.1) is in-
spired by previous models assuming that research productivity is measured by rate of research
output (e.g., number of patents per year) and is driven by resource intensity (see for example,
Griliches, 1994). The performance improvement function is of the Cobb- Douglas form. In Ho
(1993) and Cohen, Eliashberg and Ho (1997), we provide empirical evidence for such functional
form, drawn from automobile, packaged software, and packaged goods industries. It suggests
that the Cobb-Douglas form is a reasonable approximation for relating the speed of performance
improvement to variation in the rate of resource input (in particular engineering labor input).
5Some research suggests that selecting a target for the development team m (either time to mar-
ket, product performance, or total development cost) may generate the following psychological
1bene¯ts (Foster et al. 1985a, 1985b, Cooper, 1994, Cooper and Tanaka, 1997) :
1. Setting a target may lead to higher awareness, peer-pressure, visibility, and motivation so
that the members of the development team become more productive.
2. Selecting a target may lead to a higher `e®ective' resource intensity because members of
the development teams work harder via over-time in order to meet the target.
Capturing these psychological bene¯ts would entail a good speci¯cation of how the resource
productivity parameter changes over time (i.e., ® becomes ®(t)). We are not aware of an
empirically well-grounded speci¯cation. Consequently, we leave this for further research.
Based on (2.1), the performance of the new product at time t is:R t ®A(t) = A + K ¢X(s) ds: (2.2)0 0
2Assuming for a moment that the level of resource is ¯xed (X(t) = X), equation (2.2) implies
that the speed of performance improvement is invariant with time. That is, performance of the
new product at its launching time, A(T ), increases linearly with time to market, T :P P
®A(T ) = A +K ¢X ¢ T : (2.3)0P P
In order to investigate the empirical validity of (2.3), four project managers at a company site
were asked to provide estimates for the expected time to market under a number of hypothetical
product performance levels given a ¯xed development resource level (for details on data collec-
3tion, see Ho, 1993). Table 1 provides the managers' estimates. Data have been normalized to
1A reviewer has pointed out that the e®ects of the metrics may actually be felt over time so one should
consider multiple new product generations in order to fully capture their bene¯ts. Clearly, our model captures
only the `steady- state' or `equilibrium' behavior.
2In the analyses of the optimal policies (section 3), we prove formally that such a stationary policy of employing
the level of resource is indeed optimal.
3The questionnaire was constructed after several rounds of structured interviews with the project members.
Each project manager was asked to provide six estimates for the revised time to market given the same level of
resources. To obtain more accurate estimates, project managers were probed about the reduced or additional
development associated with the revised new product performance level. Our methodology is similar to that of
Mans¯eld (1988).
64the values of current targets.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ]
Figure 2 shows the results of regressing T against A(T ). The statistical signi¯cance of theP P
parameter estimates is indicated by asterisk and the standard error is given in the parentheses.
Given the statistically signi¯cant parameter estimates for T and the high adjusted R-squaredP
values across all projects (from 0.83-0.98), it appears that product performance and time-to-
market are linearly related, at least in terms of managers' expectations, for the range or product
performance of interests. In summary, the results of this anecdotal study provide some empirical
support for performance improvement equation (2.3).
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ]
The ¯rm's market share is a function of both its own product performance and the product
performance of its competition. A reasonable market share function, frequently used in the
marketing literature, is the attraction model (Bell, Keeney, and Little, 1975). The attraction
model has been employed extensively in marketing and has received empirical support (See
Cooper and Nakanishi, 1988 for a good review). The net revenue rate at time t for the ¯rm
that develops and introduces the new product is the product of the product category demand
rate, the pro¯t margin, and and the ¯rm's market share:
8 A0>> R ¢ ; 0 · t < T ;> 0 P> A +A0 c<
R(t) = (2.4)>>> A(T )> PR ¢ ; T · t < T;: 1 PA(T ) +AcP
where
4This helps to ensure con¯dentiality of the data. Moreover, the project managers appeared more comfortable
at providing data that used current targets as reference points.
7R(t) = net revenue rate at t for the ¯rm,
R = product category net revenue rate for the existing product,0
R = product category net revenue rate for the new product,1
A = performance level of the existing product,0
A(T ) = performance level of the new product,P
A = competitive product performance level during the time horizon.c
The cumulative development costs of the new product at time t are:Z t
TC(t) = X(s)ds: (2.5)
0
The ¯rm's cumulative pro¯t at time t is determined as follows,
T¦(t) = TR(t)¡ TC(t); (2.6)
where TR(t) and TC(t) are total revenues and costs at time t, respectively. The total revenue
function is given by: Z t
TR(t) = R(s)ds: (2.7)
0
where R(:) is given in (2.4). The ¯rm's decision set is4 = fX(t); T g. We de¯ne the cumulativeP
pro¯t function, T¦(±; T ), as the total pro¯t, by end of the window of opportunity, with decision
± 2 4. The ¯rm's decision problem can be stated as
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤maxT¦(±; T ) = TR(± ; T )¡ TC(± ; T ) = T¦ (± ; T ): (2.8)
±²4
The combination of equations (2.1) through (2.7) generates an explicit representation of the
¯rm's cumulative pro¯t by the end of time horizon. This substitution yields:
[G1] ·
A0¤ ¤T¦ (± ; T ) = max R ¢ ¢ T0 P
±²4 A +A0 c #R ZT ®P TPA + K ¢X(s) ds0 0+R ¢ ¢ (T ¡ T )¡ X(s)ds : (2.9)R1 PTP ® 0A + K ¢X(s) ds+A0 c0
8The optimization problem [G1] can be reformulated as a an optimal control problem with state
variable, A(t), and two control decisions, X(t) and T (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982). In optimalP
control terminology, the salvage term, ©(T ;A(T )) is de¯ned as follows:P P
A A(T )def 0 P©(T ;A(T )) = R ¢ T + R ¢ ¢ (T ¡ T ): (2.10)0 1P P P PA +A A(T ) +A0 c P c
The optimization problem [G1] becomes:
[G2] Z TP
max T¦(X(t); T ) = ¡X(t)dt+ ©(T ;A(T )) (2.11)P P P
0
®_subject to A(t) = K ¢X(t) ; (2.12)
A(0) = A ; ¯xed; (2.13)0
T ; A(T ); are free: (2.14)P P
3 Analyses of Optimal New Product Development Policies
3.1 The Unconstrained New Product Development Process
The ¯rst proposition concerns the structure of the optimal level of resource intensity in an
unconstrained development process (i.e., no restrictions on controls).
¤ ¤Proposition 1 : The optimal level of resource intensity is time invariant, i.e, X (t) = X ; 8t.
Proof: See Appendix.
9The intuition behind this result is based on two observations. First, the performance produc-
tion process exhibits diminishing return to scale (i.e., the speed of performance improvement
is strictly concave in the resource intensity). Thus, the average of the speeds of performance
improvement at any two resource intensity levels is strictly smaller than the speed of perfor-
mance improvement at the average of the two resource intensity levels. Second, the performance
of the new product before launch has no implication on the life-cycle pro¯ts. That is, for a
given level of product performance at launch, the evolution of the product performance during
development does not matter as long as it begins with the same initial product performance.
These two observations explain the above structural (stationarity) result.
The same result can be generalized to a new product development process that has multiple
stages as long as the performance improvement over stages are additive in nature. Here, it
can be shown that the level of resource intensity at each of the development stages should be
constant across time if it is diminishing return to scale but di®erent stages can have di®erent
levels of resource intensity (see Ho, 1993).
Having established formally that the optimal level of resource intensity is time invariant simpli-
¯es the mathematical derivations greatly. Since resource intensity is stationary (i.e., X(t) = X),R T ® ®Pwe have A(T ) = K ¢X(t) dt = A +K ¢X ¢T . Consequently, we can express the salvage0P P0
®term (©(T ;A(T )) in terms of X and T explicitly. Substituting A(T ) = A + K ¢X ¢ TP P P P 0 P
into equation (2.10), we have:
®A A +K ¢X ¢ T0 0 P©(T ;X) = R ¢ T + R ¢ ¢ (T ¡ T ): (3.1)P 0 P 1 P®A +A A +K ¢X ¢ T +A0 c 0 cP
The second proposition characterizes the globally optimal policies.
Proposition 2 : Under the unconstrained development process, the optimal level of resource
¤ ¤intensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are jointly characterized by following optimality con-P
ditions:
¤ ® ¤R ¢A 1 A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A1 c 0 c¤ ¤ ¤P¢ (T ¡ T ) = ¢ [ ] ¢ [X ¢ T ]; (3.2)P P¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A ® K ¢ (X ) ¢ T0 cP P
10
¤ ® ¤A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T A 1¡ ®0 0 ¤PR ¢ ¡R ¢ = X ¢ : (3.3)1 0¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A A +A ®0 c 0 cP
Proof: See Appendix.
The above optimality conditions can be interpreted as follows. The ¯rst optimality condition
(3.2) speci¯es a condition relating to the competitive's cumulative net revenue after product
launch. It states that the resource intensity and time to market should be chosen such that the
¤competitive's cumulati
ve net revenue after product launch (during the time window T ¡ T )
P
¤ ¤(the left-hand-side) is equal to a factor times the total development cost (X ¢ T ) (the lastP
term of the right-hand- side). This factor is the ratio of the total product performance in
¤ ® ¤the market after launch (A + K ¢ (X ) ¢ T + A ) to the product of the increase in the0 cP
¤ ® ¤¯rm's product performance (K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) and its resource productivity parameter (®). ThisP
optimality condition suggests that a compression of product life-cycle (i.e., a decrease in T ) will
¤ ¤be accompanied by either a lower total development cost (i.e., a smaller X ¢ T ) or a lowerP
¤ ® ¤level of product performance improvement (i.e., a smaller K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ). For a ¯xed level ofP
resource intensity, this means an early and more evolutionary product innovation.
The second optimality condition (3.3) relates the increase in the ¯rm's net revenue rate after
product launch (the left-hand-side) to the optimal resource intensity. It states that the former
is a factor times the latter and the factor is the ratio of one minus the resource productivity
parameter and the resource productivity parameter. Consequently, a ¯rm that has an attractive
existing product (high A ) will have a lower optimal resource intensity and a longer time to0
market. In other words, an attractive existing product reduces the need for the ¯rm to rush to
market by employing a higher level of resource intensity.
Another way to interpret the two optimality conditions is to apply Dorfman-Steiner (1954)
theory on static monopolistic optimization. Recalling the de¯nition of the salvage term in
equation (3.1), the elasticities of the net revenue with respect to the decision variables (time to
±© ±©
© ©market (T ) and resource intensity (X)) are given by e = and e = , respectively.P T X±T ±XP P
XTP
±© ±©¤ ¤At optimality, = X and = T . Thus, the two elasticities are identical and given byP±T ±Xp¤ ¤X ¢TP . That is, at optimality, the elasticities are both equal to the total development cost¤ ¤©(T ;X )P
per unit of net revenue.
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^3.2 The Target Time-to-Market (T ) Development ProcessP
The target time-to-market development process is equivalent to setting T equal to or less thanP
^a particular value T , in problem G2. We consider the interesting case where the ¯rm sets anP
¤^ambitious (accelerated) target for time-to-market (i.e., T < T ).P P
Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal level of the development resource under the target
Ttiming development process. It is denoted as X .
Proposition 3 : Under the target time-to-market development process, the optimal level
Tof development resource (X ) is characterized by the following optimality condition:
T ® ^R ¢A 1 A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A1 c 0 cP T^ ^¢ (T ¡ T ) = ¢ [ ] ¢ [X ¢ T ] (3.4)P PT ® T ®^ ^®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A K ¢ (X ) ¢ T0 P c P
Proof: See Appendix.
Unlike the unconstrained development process, the target timing development process has only
one optimality condition. This optimality condition is similar to the optimality condition (3.2)
¤^except we have the term T instead of T . If the ¯rm sets an ambitious target for time toP P
¤ T ¤^market (which is common in practice) so that T < T , it can be shown that X > X andP P
T ¤ 5A(T ) < A(T ). Thus we expect to see a systematic upward bias in the development resourceP P
intensity and a more evolutionary product performance under the target timing development
process.
T ¤ T ¤Comparing X with X , we note that X is not a function of R and A , whereas X is.0 0
This suggests that the target time-to-market development process can be seriously °awed in
situations when the ¯rm has an existing product that has a high net revenue rate. That is, the
target time-to-market development process fails to account for the cannibalistic e®ect of new
product on the existing product.
5 D^It follows from the fact that the left-hand-side is decreasing in T and increasing in X and the right-hand-P
D^side is increasing in T and decreasing in X .P
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Indeed, Cohen and Ho (1996) investigated strategies of several new product launches by an
industrial equipment ¯rm. They observed that a short time to market target across all product
launches can be problematic. This is so because the approach fails to account for di®erences in
market characteristics especially the degree of success of the existing products. Consequently,
the new product launches did not meet the ¯rm's expectation of success.
Similarly, we can interpret the above optimality condition using the concept of elasticity. The
±©
©elasticity of the net revenue with respect to resource intensity (X) is given by e = . AtX ±X
X
T ^X ¢T±© P^optimality, = T and hence the elasticity is given by .P T^±X ©(T ;X )P
^3.3 The Target Performance (A) Development Process
The target performance development process is equivalent to constraining the state variable
^A(t) to be equal to or greater than a ¯xed value, A, in problem G2. We consider the interesting
¤^case of A ¸ A(T ) where the ¯rm sets an ambitious performance target.P
Proposition 4 : Under the target performance development process, the optimal level of
PerfPerfresource intensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are given by the following closed-formP
expressions:
^ AA 0R ¢ ¡R ¢1 0^ A +Ac0A+APerf cX = ; (3.5)1( ¡ 1)®
1 ®^(A¡A ) ¢ ( ¡ 1)0Perf ®T = : (3.6)P ^ AA 0 ®K ¢ [R ¢ ¡R ¢ ]1 0^ A +A0 cA+Ac
PerfIn addition, total development cost, TC, as a function of the optimal time to market TP
when the size of the development team is chosen optimally, is given as follows:
1A^¡A0 ®[ ]KTC = : (3.7)1¡®Perf
®[T ]P
Proof: See Appendix.
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The structure of the optimal new product development policy is interesting. Given a product
PerfPerf^performance target A, the strategic decisions X and T become separable. In otherP
PerfPerfwords, X is not a function of T and vice versa. This suggests that once a strategicP
^target level of performance (A) is chosen, the timing and level of resource intensity decisions
can be decentralized. In this respect, the target performance development process has an edge
over other development processes because it requires less coordination between the marketing
and R&D functions.
¤ Perf ¤ 6^If A > A(T ), then X > X . Thus there is systematic upward bias in the developmentP
resource intensity under the target performance development process. Note that the optimal
Perfresource intensity under the target performance development process X is a not a func-
tion of K, whereas it is under the unconstrained development process (compare equations (3.2)
and (3.5)). This suggests that the development resource intensity under the target performance
development process can be seriously biased when the level of capital investment in the develop-
Perf ¤ment technology changes rapidly. From equation (3.6), it can be easily shown that T > TPP
under most combinations of parameters. Thus, the target performance development process
may lead to delayed product launches that miss the window of opportunity.
Proposition 4 has several implications that can be obtained via standard comparative statics
analyses. It implies that the optimal resource intensity should be larger if the target level of
^product performance (A) is high. Put di®erently, a revolutionary new product should be ac-
companied by a more intense development resource strategy. The optimal resource intensity
increases with the product category net revenue rate of the new product market (R ). Also, it1
increases with the labor productivity parameter (®). It decreases, however, with the product
category net revenue rate of the existing product R , and the performance level of the existing0
Perfproduct (A ). The optimal time-to-market, T , decreases with the product category net0 P
revenue rate of the new product market (R ), the labor productivity parameter (®), and the1
constant of proportionality for speed of performance improvement (K). It increases with prod-
uct category net revenue rate of the existing product R .0
6 Perf ¤ ¤^This follows directly from equation (3.5). Note that X = X if A = A(T ).P
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Since 0 < ® < 1, total development cost, TC in (3.7), is a decreasing convex function of time
to market. This result links our work with the economics/R&D race and PERT/CPM liter-
atures. The R&D race literature assumes that ¯rms pursue a ¯xed performance target and
that development cost is convex in time to market. The PERT/CPM literature shows that for
a given R&D project complexity, and if each separate project activity has a linear time-cost
tradeo®, then total development cost is a convex function of time to market (Fulkerson, 1961;
Rosenbloom, 1964). Proposition 4 provides an analytical basis for this convex cost relationship.
The target performance is frequently employed by companies where product liability is crucial
to the company's reputation and survival (e.g., pharmaceutical, aircraft manufacturing). This
extreme emphasis on performance involves numerous and rigorous product testing that lead to
extended time to market. This often leads to less than optimal pro¯tability. The gap between
actual and optimal pro¯tability represents the cost of insurance the ¯rm bears to protect itself
from a product liability suit.
^3.4 The Target Development Cost (TC) Process
R TPThe approach is similar to the globally optimal procedure [G2] except that the term X(t)dt0
^is constrained to be equal to or less than TC. We consider the interesting case of a limited
¤ ¤^budget where TC < X ¢T (i.e., under spending). Indeed, Ming and Eliashberg (2000) observeP
under-spending behavior on product development in the pharmaceutical industry.
Proposition 5 : Under the target development cost process, the optimal level of resource
D Dintensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are characterized by the following optimality condi-P
tions:
® D 1¡®^A +K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) A0 0PR ¢ ¡R ¢1 0D® 1¡®^ A +AA +K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) +A 0 c0 cP
® D ¡® D^K ¢ (TC) (T ) ¢ (T ¡ T ) R ¢ A1 cP P= (1¡ ®) ¢ [ ] ¢ [ ]; (3.8)
D D® 1¡® ® 1¡®^ ^A +K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) +A A +K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) +A0 c 0 cP P
^TCDX = : (3.9)DTP
Proof: See Appendix.
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The optimality condition (3.8) relates the increase in the ¯rm's net revenue rate (the left-hand-
side) to that of the competitive's net revenue rate (the last term of the right-hand-side) after
product launch. The former is a factor of the latter and the factor is the product of one mi-
nus resource productivity parameter and the ratio of maximal allowable increase in the ¯rm's
® D ¡® D D ® D^product performance (i.e., K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) ¢ (T ¡T ) = K ¢ (X ) ¢ (T ¡T )) and the totalP P P
product performance in the market after launch.
¤ ¤ D ¤ D ¤^If limited budget is available (TC < X ¢ T ), then either X < X or T < T must beD P P P
D ¤ D ¤true. If the former is true (X < X ), then A(T ) < A(T ) is true for most combinations ofP P
D ¤ D ¤parameters. However, if T < T , it is necessary that A(T ) < A(T ). Thus, the new productP P P P
launch under the target development cost process tends to be premature with evolutionary
product innovations.
4 Competitive Scenarios
A limitation of the analyses discussed so far is that we do not explicitly capture competition.
There are two ways to model competition under our modeling set up. The ¯rst way is to capture
an increasingly competitive environment by replacing A with A (t) where A (t) is increasingc c c
in t. This is the case where the underlying ¯rm is not explicitly competing with any particular
¯rm in an increasing performance norm industry. The second way is to model the new product
launch as a truly competitive game. Here we focus on the leading ¯rm. We analyze how the
¯rm will have to take into account her action on a follower. Both scenarios are discussed next.
4.1 Passive Competitive Scenarios
We model a non-stationary environment where the industry performance norm gradually in-
creases over time such that A (t) = A + ¯ ¢ t. Under this scenario, the ¯rm's pro¯t functionc c0
becomes for decision vector ± = fT ;Xg is:P
Z Z ®T TP A A +K ¢X ¢ T0 0 PT¦(±; T ) = R ¢ dt+ R ¢ dt¡X ¢ T0 1 P®A +A + ¯ ¢ t A +K ¢X ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ t0 T0 c0 0 P c0P
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R ¢A A +A + ¯ ¢ T0 0 0 c0 P= ¢ ln( )
¯ A +A0 c0
® ®R (A +K ¢X ¢ T ) A +K ¢X ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T1 0 P 0 P c0+ ¢ ln( )¡X ¢ T : (4.1)P®¯ A +K ¢X ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 P c0 P
The next proposition characterizes the globally optimal policies.
Proposition 6 : Under the unconstrained development process and a non-stationary com-
petitive environment such that A (t) = A +¯ ¢ t, and if ¯ is small enough, the optimal level ofc c0
¤ ¤resource intensity (X ) and time to market (T ) are jointly characterized by following optimalityP
conditions:
2 ¤ 2R ¢ (A + ¯ ¢ T ) ¯ ¢ (T ¡ T )1 c0 ¤ P¢ (T ¡ T )¡P¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T 2(A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T )0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ¤1 A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 ¤ ¤P P= ¢ [ ] ¢ [X ¢ T ]; (4.2)P¤¤ ®® K ¢ (X ) ¢ TP
¤ ® ¤A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T A 1¡ ®0 0 ¤PR ¢ ¡R ¢ = x ¢ : (4.3)1 0¤ ¤ ¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T A +A + ¯ ¢ T ®0 c0 0 c0P P P
Proof: See Appendix.
Comparing the above optimality conditions with those given in equations (3.2)-(3.3) for the
stationary competitive environment, we note the following similarities and di®erences:
1. The two sets of optimality conditions are similar except for an extra term associated with
the increasingly competitive case in the ¯rst optimality condition.
2. The optimality conditions for the increasingly competitive case help to clarify those for
the stationary case. We note that the denominator in the LHS of the ¯rst optimality
condition is the total industry product performance at the end of the life cycle while the
denominator in the LHS of the second optimality condition is the total industry product
performance immediately right after the product launch. (Since they are identical in the
stationary case, there is no way to make this distinction).
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¤3. We shall focus on optimality condition (3.2). The term in the LHS is decreasing in T andP
¤ ¤ ¤X and the term in the right hand side in increasing in T and X . Since the extra termP
is strictly positive in optimality condition (4.2), the e®ect of an increasingly competitive
environment is to make both sides of the optimality condition take a lower value. This
¤ ¤can be accomplished by either a lower X or T . The optimality conditions (3.3) andP
¤ ¤(4.3) suggest that a lower T must be accomplished by a lower X (since the LHS isP
¤ ¤ ¤increasing in X and T and the RHS side is in increasing in X and is independent ofP
¤T .) Thus we expect either a
n early product launch accompanied by a lower investment
P
in resource intensity or simply a lower investment in resource intensity in an increasingly
competitive environment.
4.2 Active Competitive Scenarios
Active competitive scenarios incorporating incumbents and new entrants (e.g., Eliashberg and
Jeuland, 1986; Roy, et al, 1994, Purohit, 1994) have typically employed the Stackelberg game
set up (Stackelberg, 1934). The competitive environment of interest is one in which new product
development is undertaken by a leader L and a follower F . The leader believes that the follower
will react to the leader's choice of time to market in a best response fashion. Knowing this,
the leader then chooses a time to market that maximizes her pro¯t. The leader and the
L Ffollower may have di®erent levels of initial product performance (A ;A ) and performance0 0
L F_ _improvement functions (A ;A ). Below, we assume that both ¯rms have exogenously given
performance improvement functions (i.e., a ¯xed resource intensity X so that the decision set
4 = fT g) and that the leader has a higher speed of product performance than the followerP
L F_ _(i.e., A > A ). Figure 3 shows the total industry product performance over time under this
competitive environment. Note that we now have two discrete jumps in the total industry
performance (rather than one discrete jump in the total industry performance).
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ]
4.2.1 Leader Facing a Prepared Follower
The follower is taken to be `prepared' in the sense that it starts product development at exactly
L Fthe same time as the leader. Let the time to market of ¯rms L and F be T and T respectively.P P
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With the usual notations, leader and follower's life-cycle pro¯ts are:
L L L_R ¢ A R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )0 1 LL F 0 L 0 F LPT¦ (T ; T ) = ¢ T + ¢ (T ¡ T )L P P P P PL F L L FL_A +A A +A ¢ T +A0 0 0 0P
L L L_R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )1 0 F L LP+ (T ¡ T )¡X ¢ T ; (4.4)P PL L F FL F_ _A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T0 0P P
F FR ¢ A R ¢A0 10 0L F L F LT¦ (T ; T ) = ¢ T + ¢ (T ¡ T )F P P P P PL F L L FL_A +A A +A ¢ T +A0 0 0 0P
F F F_R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )1 0 F F FP+ ¢ (T ¡ T )¡X ¢ T : (4.5)P PL L F FL F_ _A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T0 0P P
The following lemma characterizes the prepared follower's optimal best response given a leader's
Lchoice of T .P
LLemma 1 : The optimal time to market for the follower given a T is:P
vu L L F L LL F L_ _ _R (A +A ¢T )(A +A ¢T+A +A ¢T )1u F L L L0 0 0P P _¡ (A +A +A ¢ T )t F 0 0 PR A0 0FR +X ¡1 F L LL_A +A +A ¢T0 0 PF¤ LT (T ) = (4.6)P P F_A
Proof: See Appendix.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal time to market for the leader under certain
conditions:
L_A FProposition 7 : De¯ne ½ = be the relative development capability of the leader. If A =0F_A
L F LA = 0 and R À maxfX ;X g, then the optimal time to market for the leader is:10
p¡(4½+ 1) + (2½+ 1) 4½+ 1L¤T = [ ]T (4.7)P 2(4½+ 1)½
Proof: See Appendix.
L¤It can be easily shown that T is decreasing in ½ so that the stronger the advantage of theP
leader in product development capability, the sooner is her optimal time to market. Note that
the advantage in product development capability can come from resource allocated to product
development (i.e., X) or the level of productivity in resource utilization (i.e., ®).
19
4.2.2 Leader Facing a Surprised Follower
The follower is taken to be `surprised' in the sense that it starts product development only after
Fthe leader has launched its new product. Let T be the follower's time to market measuredP
Lfrom T . The leader and follower's life-cycle pro¯ts are:P
L L L_R ¢A R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )0 1 L0 0L F L FPT¦ (T ; T ) = ¢ T + ¢ TL P P P PL F L L FL_A +A A +A ¢ T +A0 0 0 0P
L L_R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )1 L0 F L L LP+ ¢ (T ¡ T ¡ T )¡X ¢ T (4.8)P P PL L F FL F_ _A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T0 0P P
F FR ¢A R ¢ A0 10 0L F L FT¦ (T ; T ) = ¢ T + ¢ TF P P P PL F L L FL_A +A A +A ¢ T +A0 0 0 0P
F F_R ¢ (A +A ¢ T )1 F0 F L F FP+ (T ¡ T ¡ T )¡X ¢ T (4.9)P P PL L F FF_ _A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ TL0 0P P
The following lemma characterizes the prepared follower's optimal best response given a leader's
Lchoice of T .P
LLemma 2 : The optimal time to market for the follower given a T is:P
vu L L F L L LL F L_ _ _R ¢(A +A ¢T )(A +A ¢(T¡T )+A +A ¢T )1u F L L L0 0 0P P P _¡ (A +A +A ¢ T )t F 0 0 PR ¢A0 0FR +X ¡1 F L LL_A +A +A ¢T0 0 PF¤ LT (T ) = (4.10)P P F_A
Proof: See Appendix.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal time to market for the leader under certain
conditions:
L_A F L F LProposition 8 : De¯ne ½ = . If A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ;X g, then the optimal10 0F_A
time to market for the leader is:
p¡4 + 16 + 4(4½¡ 1)L¤T = [ ]T (4.11)P 2(4½¡ 1)
Proof: See Appendix.
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L¤Again, it can be easily shown that T is decreasing in ½ so that the stronger the advantage ofP
the leader, the smaller is her optimal to market.
It is interesting to compare the optimal launching times under both scenarios. The following
proposition establishes the value of \surprising" the follower:
F L F LProposition 9 : If A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ;X g, then the leader that faces a10 0
surprised follower always launches a product with higher level of performance and at a later
time than the one that faces a prepared follower.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, the leader facing a prepared follower feels a greater pressure to launch the new
product than the one who manages to surprise the competitor.
5 Discussion
We have developed a model for examining the interplay of three determinants of new product
success: 1) time to market, 2) product performance, and 3) development cost. We have applied
the model to analyze the merits and shortcomings of setting a target on each of the three new
product performance metrics commonly used in industry: (1) the time-to-market target, (2)
the product performance target, (3) the development cost target.
Our analytical results show that:
² An overly ambitious time-to-market target leads to an upward bias in resource in-
tensity usage and a downward bias in product performance (i.e., evolutionary product
innovation.) In addition, the optimal resource intensity is not a®ected by R ;A . This0 0
result suggests that the target time-to-market development process may ignore the e®ect
of cannibalization and thus can perform suboptimally if there is a signi¯cant degree of
cannibalization in the existing product market (e.g., R is large).0
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² Under the target performance development process, the coordination between market-
ing and R&D is easier because the resulting development resource intensity and time to
market decisions are separable. An overly ambitious target leads to an upward bias in
the development resource intensity. In addition, the resource intensity is not a®ected by
changes in K which capture capital investments in development technology. This result
suggests that the target performance development process may not fully re°ect the level
of development capability in its development resource intensity decision and may perform
suboptimally when there is a signi¯cant change in ¯rm's development capability. The
target performance development process also leads to delayed product launches which
miss the window of opportunity.
² Under the target development cost approach, allocating a limited budget to a new
product development project can lead to a downward bias in product performance and a
premature product launch (i.e., an evolutionary product introduction).
² A ¯rm facing a gradually increasing performance norm in her industry will lower the
investment in resource intensity.
² A leader facing a prepared follower feels a greater time pressure to launch the new product
than the one who manages to surprise the competitor.
Extensions of the work described in this paper could include explicit incorporation of risk (both
for product development and in the market). In addition, the policy implications of our results
suggest a number of testable hypotheses, which can be studied using cross-sectional procedures.
Finally, the modeling approach, presented here, can be implemented through a decision support
system in a speci¯c company context (see Cohen, Eliashberg and Ho, 1997). Application of such
a system would introduce formalism and rigor to a complex and critical management process.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppressing the time argument, the Hamiltonian of G2 is:
®H = ¡X + ¸ ¢K ¢X : (6.1)
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The necessary conditions for optimality are (Kamien and Schwartz,1992):
H = 0; (6.2)X
¤_¸ = ¡H ; (6.3)A
¤ ¤H(T ) = ¡© (T ) since T is free; (6.4)T PP PP
¤ ¤ ¤¸ (T ) = © (T ) since A(T ) is free: (6.5)A PP P
¤ ¤_ _From (6.3), we have ¸ = ¡H . Since H is not a function of A, we have ¸ = 0. Di®erentiatingAA A
(6.1) with respect to X, we obtain:
®¡1H = ¡1 + ¸ ¢K ¢ ® ¢X : (6.6)X
¤Setting (6.6) to zero and solving for X , we obtain:
1¤ ¤ 1¡®X = [¸ ¢K ¢ ®] : (6.7)
¤ ¤ ¤_Since, ¸ = 0 (i.e., ¸ is time invariant), X is time invariant. Q. E. D.A A
Proof of Proposition 2
From (6.1), we have the maximized Hamiltonian:
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ®H = ¡X + ¸ ¢K ¢ (X ) : (6.8)
¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Since X and ¸ are time invariant, H is also time invariant. Since H is independent of A
¤for given ¸ , the necessary optimality conditions (6.2) - (6.5) are also su±cient (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1992, pp. 221- 226).
From (6.5), we obtain:
Ac¤ ¤ ¤¸ = © (T ) = R ¢ ¢ (T ¡ T ): (6.9)1A P P¤ 2[A(T ) +A ]cP
¤ ¤Since ¸ is time invariant, it is completely determined from 0 to T by the RHS of equationP
(6.9). Substituting equation (6.9) into (6.7), we obtain the desired optimality condition (3.2).
From (6.4), we have:
¤A A(T )0¤ ¤ PH(T ) = ¡© (T ) = ¡R ¢ +R ¢ : (6.10)0 1TP PP ¤A +A A(T ) +A0 c cP
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¤ ¤H is completely characterized from 0 to T by RHS of equation (6.10) because it is timeP
invariant. Equating (6.8) and (6.10) we obtain:
¤A A(T )0¤ ¤ ¤ ® P¡X + ¸ ¢K ¢ (X ) = ¡R ¢ +R ¢ : (6.11)0 1 ¤A +A A(T ) +A0 c cP
Simplifying terms, we obtain the desired optimality condition (3.3). Q. E. D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The necessary and su±cient optimality conditions are identical to problem [G2] except that
condition (6.4) is no longer valid. The expression for optimal level of resource intensity (6.7)
Tremains the same. The revised auxiliary variable (¸ ) is:
AcT ^¸ = R ¢ ¢ (T ¡ T ): (6.12)1 P2^[A(T ) +A ]cP
TThe optimal level of resource intensity can be solved by substituting ¸ into equation (6.7). Q.
E. D.
Proof of Proposition 4
The necessary and su±cient optimality conditions are identical to problem [G2] except that
condition (6.5) is no longer valid. The expression for optimal level of resource intensity (6.7)
Perfremains the same except that the auxiliary variable (¸ ) is now di®erent. Instead of (6.5),
we have the following transversality condition:
PerfZ T ®P Perf ^1¡®K ¢ [K ¢ ¸ ¢ ®] dt = A¡A (6.13)0
0
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The above transversality condition requires that the total improvement in the level of perfor-
Perf Perf^mance from 0 to T is A¡A . The revised auxiliary variable ¸ , is found to be:0P
1¡®A^¡A1 0 ®[ ]Perf® K¢TPerf P¸ = (6.14)A K
From (6.4), we have:
^A A0Perf PerfH(T ) = ¡© (T ) = ¡R ¢ +R ¢ : (6.15)T 0 1PP P ^A +A A+A0 c c
Equations (6.7) and (6.11) become:
1Perf Perf 1¡®X = [K ¢ ¸ ¢ ®] ; (6.16)
A^ A0Perf Perf Perf ®X +R ¢ = R ¢ + ¸ ¢K ¢ (X ) : (6.17)1 0^ A +AA+A 0 cc
Perf 1¡®(X )PerfFrom equation (6.16), we have ¸ = . Substituting this into equation (6.17) andK¢®
simplifying, we obtain:
^ AA 0R ¢ ¡R ¢1 0^ A +Ac0A+APerf cX = : (6.18)1( ¡ 1)®
Q QQ Q ® ^The desired expression for T can be found by substituting X into K ¢ (X ) ¢T = A¡A .0P P
This yields:
1 ®^(A¡A ) ¢ ( ¡ 1)0Perf ®T = (6.19)P ^ AA 0 ®K ¢ [R ¢ ¡R ¢ ]1 0^ A +Ac0A+Ac
^Given that the ¯rm pursues a ¯xed performance target A and chooses the optimal size of the
Perfdevelopment team X , the total development cost, TC, as a function of T is given by:P
PerfTC = X ¢ T : (6.20)P
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® ^Since a ¯xed target level of performance is pursued, we have K ¢ (X ) ¢ T = (A¡A ), or0Perf P
1A^¡A Perf0 ®X = [ ] . Substitute X into (6.20), we obtain:Perf K¢TP
^ 1A¡A0
®TC = [ ] ¢ T (6.21)PK ¢ TP
^ 11A¡A 1¡0 ®®= [ ] ¢ T (6.22)PK
To prove that TC is a decreasing convex function of T , we take the ¯rst and second derivativesP
of TC with respect to T .P
^ 11@TC A¡A 1 ¡0 ®®= [ ] ¢ (1¡ ) ¢ T (6.23)P@T K ®P
2 ^ 11@ TC A¡A 1 1 ¡ ¡10 ®®= [ ] ¢ (1¡ ) ¢ (¡ ) ¢ T (6.24)P2@T K ® ®P
2@TC @ TCNote that if ® < 1, we have < 0 and > 0. Q. E. D.2@T @TP P
Proof of Proposition 5R TP ^In problem [G2], if ¡X(t)dt = ¡TC, we have a static optimization problem (since we know0
D D D ® D 1¡®^that X (t) = X at optimal). Substitute A(T ) = K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) into ©(T ;A(T )),P PP P
D Dthe objective is a function of T only. Di®erentiating ©(T ;A(T )) with respect to T , weP PP P
have:
® D 1¡® ® D ¡® D^ ^A A +K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) A ¢K ¢ (TC) ¢ (T ) ¢ (T ¡ T )0 0 cP P PR ¢ ¡R ¢ +R ¢ (1¡ ®)0 1 1D D® 1¡® ® 1¡® 2^ ^A +A A + (TC) ¢ (T ) +A [A + (TC) ¢ (T ) +A ]0 c 0 c 0 cP P
Setting the above expression to zero and simplifying we obtain the desired ¯rst-order condition.
Proof of Proposition 6
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Di®erentiating T¦ with respect to T and X yields the following ¯rst-order conditions:P
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ® ¤ ®R ¢ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) K ¢ (X ) K ¢ (X ) + ¯1 0 P ¢ ( ¡ )¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®¯ A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) +A + ¯ ¢ T R ¢K ¢ (X ) R ¢ A0 c0 1 0 0 ¤+ln( ) ¢ + ¡X = 0 (6.25)¤ ¤ ¤®A +K ¢X ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T ¯ A +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ¤ ®¡1 ¤ ¤ ®¡1R ¢ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) ® ¢K ¢ T ¢ (X ) ® ¢K ¢ T ¢ (X )1 0 P P P¢ ( ¡ )¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®¯ A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ¢ A + ¯ ¢ T A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ®¡1 ¤A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T R ¢ ® ¢K ¢ (X ) ¢ T0 c0 1 ¤P P+ln( ) ¢ ¡ T = 0 (6.26)P¤ ¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T ¯0 c0P P
Simplifying equation (6.26), we have:
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ® ¤ ®R ¢ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) K ¢ (X ) K ¢ (X )1 0 P ¢ ( ¡ )¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®¯ A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ¢ A + ¯ ¢ T A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ® ¤A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T R ¢K ¢ (X ) X0 c0 1P+ln( ) ¢ = (6.27)¤ ¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T ¯ ®0 c0P P
Substituting the above equation into equation (6.25), we have:
¤ ¤ ® ¤X R ¢ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) R ¢A1 0 0 0 ¤P¡ + ¡X = 0 (6.28)¤ ¤ ¤¤ ®® A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T A +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
Simplifying, we obtain the desired optimality condition (4.3). From equation (6.27), we have:
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ® ¤ ®R ¢ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) K ¢ (X ) K ¢ (X )1 0 P ¢ ( ¡ )¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®¯ A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ¢ A + ¯ ¢ T A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ® ¤ ¤ ® ¤A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T R ¢K ¢ (X ) X0 c0 1P+ln( ) ¢ = (6.29)¤ ¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T ¯ ®0 c0P P
Simplifying the above equation, we have:
¤ ® ¤ ® ¤ ¤R ¢K ¢ (X ) (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ) ¢ ¯(T ¡ T )1 0 P Pf ¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ®¯ (A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T ¢A + ¯ ¢ T )(A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T )0 c0 0 c0P P P
¤ ¤¯ ¢ (T ¡ T ) XP+ln(1 + )g = (6.30)¤ ¤¤ ®A +K ¢ (X ) ¢ T +A + ¯ ¢ T ®0 c0P P
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¤¯¢(T¡T )PIf ¯ is small enough such that ¿ 1, we can approximate ln(1 +¤ ¤¤ ®A +K¢(X ) ¢T +A +¯¢T0 c0P P¤ ¤ 2 ¤ 2¯¢(T¡T ) ¯¢(T¡T ) ¯ ¢(T¡T )P P P) by ¡ . Simplifying,¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤¤ ® ¤ ® ¤ ® 2A +K¢(X ) ¢T +A +¯¢T A +K¢(X ) ¢T +A +¯¢T 2(A +K¢(X ) ¢T +A +¯¢T )0 c0 0 c0 0 c0P P P P P P
we obtain the desired optimality condition (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 1
LThe optimal time to market for the follower for a given T can be determined as in PropositionP
L L L_1 with A = A +A ¢ T . Thus we have the following optimality condition:c 0 P
F F L L L_ _R ¢ A 1 A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T1 c 0 0F¤ F FP P(T ¡ T ) = ¢ [ ] ¢ [X ¢ T ]P PF F¤ L L FF L F_ _ _®A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T A ¢ TF0 0P P P
The proposition follows directly from solving the above expression.
Proof of Proposition 7
L F F LIf A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ;X g, then equation (4.6) becomes:10 0
q
F¤ L LL LT (T ) = ½ ¢ T (½ ¢ T + T )¡ ½ ¢ T (6.31)P P PP P
L_A F¤ Lwhere ½ = . Substituting T (T ) into equation (4.4) and simplifying, we obtain:F P P_A
q
L L L L LL LT¦ (T ) = R ¢ [2 ½T (½T + T )¡ 2½T ¡ T ]¡X ¢ T : (6.32)1L P P P PP P
q
L L LL LT¦ (T ) is concave in T because ½T (½T + T ) is concave in T . Thus the ¯rst orderL P P PP P
Lcondition is necessary and su±cient. Di®erentiating T¦ with respect to T and setting theL P
¯rst derivative to zero, we obtain the following ¯rst-order condition:
2 L L2½ ¢ T + ½ ¢ T XPq = 2½+ 1 + ¼ 2½+ 1 (6.33)
RL L 1½ ¢ T ¢ (½T + T )P P
Simplifying the expression, we have the following quadratic expression:
2 L 2 L 2(4½ + ½)(T ) + (4½ ¢ T + T )T ¡ ½ ¢ T = 0: (6.34)P P
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L¤Solving the quadratic equation we obtain the required expression for T .P
Proof of Lemma 2
LThe optimal time to market for the follower for a given T can be determined as in PropositionP
L L L L_1 with A = A + A ¢ T and has the time window of (T ¡ T ). Thus we have the followingc 0 P P
optimality condition:
R ¢A1 c L F¤(T ¡ T ¡ T )P PF¤ L LF L_ _A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T0 0P P
F F L L L_ _1 A +A ¢ T +A +A ¢ T0 0 F FP P= ¢ [ ] ¢ [X ¢ T ] (6.35)PFF_® A ¢ TF P
The proposition follows directly from solving the above expression.
Proof of Proposition 8
L F F LIf A = A = 0 and R À maxfX ;X g, then equation (4.10) becomes:10 0
q
F¤ L LL L LT (T ) = ½ ¢ T (½ ¢ T + (T ¡ T ))¡ ½ ¢ T ; (6.36)P P PP P P
L_A F¤ Lwhere ½ = . Substituting T (T ) into equation (4.8) and simplifying, we obtain:F P P_A
q
L L L L LL L LT¦ (T ) = R ¢ [2 ½T (½T + (T ¡ T ))¡ 2½T ¡ T ]¡X ¢ T : (6.37)1L P P P PP P P
L LT¦ (T ) is concave in T as long as ½ > 1. Thus the ¯rst order condition is necessary andL P P
Lsu±cient. Di®erentiating T¦ with respect to T and setting the ¯rst derivative to zero, weL P
obtain the following ¯rst-order condition:
2 L L(2½ ¡ 2½)T + ½ ¢ T XP = 2½+ ¼ 2½ (6.38)L L L R½T (½ ¢ T + T ¡ T ) 1P P P
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Simplifying the expression, we have the following quadratic expression:
L 2 L 2(4½¡ 1)(T ) + 4T ¢ T ¡ T = 0: (6.39)P P
L¤Solving the quadratic equation we obtain the required expression for T .P
Proof of Proposition 9
If ½ > 1, then p p¡4 + 16 + 4(4½¡ 1) 1(4½+ 1) + (2½+ 1) 4½+ 1
<
2(4½¡ 1 2(4½+ 1)½
Thus, Proposition 9 follows.
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TP T Time
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Existing Product
New Product
Development Marketing
Figure 1 The Firm's Product Performance in the Market Over Time
•  Project Alpha:
   A(Tp)  = -0.0684       +        0.8694  Tp
                   (0.1287)                (01177)**               
                   (Adj R-sq = 0.90)
•  Project Beta
    A(Tp)  = -0.2631       +        0.8320  Tp
                    (0.1361)                (0.1490)**
                    (Adj R-sq = 0.83)
•  Project Gamma
  A(Tp)  =  0.3714       +         0.5714  Tp
                     (0.0425)**            (0.0369)**
                     (Adj R-sq = 0.98)
•  Project Delta
  A(Tp)  =  0.5121       +          0.4322  Tp
                     (0.0497)**             (0.0408)**
                     (Adj R-sq = 0.95)
**  statistically significant at 1% level
Figure 2: The Relationship Between Product Performance and Time to Market
T Time
Total Industry 
Product Performance
Figure 3: Total Industry Product Performance Over Time
Leader Launches
its New Product
Follower Launches
its New Product
Alpha Beta Gamma DeltaProject
0.7 Ax
0.8 Ax
0.9 Ax
1.0 Ax
1.1 Ax
1.2 Ax
1.3 Ax
0.80 Tα
0.90 Tα
0.95 Tα
1.00 Tα
1.10 Tα
1.25 Tα
1.50 Tα
Ax, Tx are realized/expected project outcomes of project x. Project managers were asked to provide subjective 
estimates  of what the time to market would be if product attraction was revised to a different level given that 
the level of development resource was held fixed.
0.50 Tβ
0.60 Tβ
0.90 Tβ
1.00 Tβ
1.00 Tβ
1.10 Tβ
1.10 Tβ
0.60 Tγ
0.80 Tγ
0.90 Tγ
1.00 Tγ
1.30 Tγ
1.50 Tγ
1.60 Tγ
0.60 Tδ
0.70 Tδ
0.80 Tδ
1.00 Tδ
1.30 Tδ
1.60 Tδ
1.90 Tδ
Tp Tp Tp TpA(Tp)
Table 1: Time to Market Estimates Under Different Levels of Product Performance for        
               Four Projects at an Industial Equipment Firm
